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THE LAW OF THE SACRED COW: SACRIFICING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT TO DEFEND ABORTION ON DEMAND
CHARLES LuGosI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judge Frank Easterbrook reminded the legal community that focus-
ing on a single strand of law was "doomed to be shallow" and would
"miss [the] unifying principles" that bring integrity and consistency to
legal doctrine.' His metaphor was the "Law of the Horse," and his con-
cern was about the development of a law unique to cyberspace.2 In this
essay, I have identified a different kind of animal that has escaped its
enclosure and has run amok in the field of constitutional law, depositing
its manure all over First Amendment jurisprudence, leaving it a mess.
What I am referring to is the "sacred cow" of abortion.'
Roe v. Wade4 and its progeny5 has had in the field of constitutional
law the same kind of effect as yeast working its way through a batch of
dough. Ordinarily that might be of no concern, unless we are talking
about unleavened bread fit for Passover. Intellectual integrity has been
sacrificed to defend the "sacred cow" of abortion by claiming the First
Amendment as its latest victim,6 subordinating the constitutional right of
* Visiting Professor of Law, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada; LL.M.
University of Pennsylvania, 2001; LL.B. The University of Western Ontario, 1979; Admitted to Bars
of Ontario (1981) and British Columbia (1982); The author dedicates this article in memory of his
beloved mother, Magdalene Lugosi, and her parents, George and Maria Kozma, who chose personal
liberty over communism, and escaped Hungary in 1945 in the hope of finding a new home that
cherished freedom. The author also wishes to acknowledge with thanks Professor Seth Kreimer,
Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania who inspired the writing of this article.
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
207 (1996).
2. Id. at 207-8.
3. This descriptive term is in no way intended to offend any Hindus or to bear any
resemblance to any established religion that in fact worships cows. In this essay, "sacred cow"
means the veneration of the right to an abortion and the elevated status of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), in the hierarchy of values defended emotionally and passionately by members of the
Supreme Court.
4. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
5. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Maher v, Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
6. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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free speech to the lesser interest or right to be let alone.7 This essay as-
serts that the right to be let alone is not constitutionally equal to the pre-
ferred position of free speech8 and must give way in the contest between
these two values in order to preserve democracy.! The purity of constitu-
tional law has been contaminated by grafting into the tree of life and
liberty the right to be let alone, which does not fit within a democratic
society treasuring the free exchange of ideas based upon the constitu-
tional right that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech . . . ."" It is my contention that the engrafted branch of law
supporting the right to be let alone from other people in the public forum
is unnatural and incompatible with its host, and will one day be rejected,
die, whither and drop off the constitutional tree.
7. Judge Thomas Cooley, in his treatise on the law of torts, used the phrase, "[tihe fight...
to be let alone" in the context of an individual's right to be free from physical trespass. THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF
CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888). Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren have generally been credited with
popularizing the phrase, "the right to be let alone," in their article, Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), which dealt with the tort liability and
intrusiveness of yellow journalists, who behaved like the modem day paparazzi who chased Princess
Diana to her death. After his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead v.
United States, elevated the right to be let alone to constitutional status. See Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) Justice Brandeis was deeply troubled
by the use of wiretaps by police to gather evidence against individuals who sought to profit during
Prohibition by importing liquor from British Columbia, Canada. See id. He believed citizens had a
constitutional right to privacy from the prying surveillance techniques of the government, declaring:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and
of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life
are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts
ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Specifically, Justice Douglas wrote:
The First Amendment is couched in absolute terms -- freedom of speech shall not be
abridged. Speech has therefore a preferred position as contrasted to some other civil
rights. For example, privacy, equally sacred to some, is protected by the Fourth
Amendment only against unreasonable searches and seizures. There is room for
regulation of the ways and means of invading privacy. No such leeway is granted the
invasion of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment."
Id.
9. In this essay, democracy is not defined as simple majority rule, but includes a society
where collective decisions are made by political institutions whose structure, composition and
practices treat all members of the community as individuals, with equal concern and respect.
Essential to this concept of democracy is "[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes
may be obtained by lawful means ... " Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Invoking the right to be let alone has choked the right of the citizen
from engaging in the core value of debating on a personal and intimate
level the moral choice of women whether or not to kill their own unborn
sons and daughters. However, since 1973, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly resorted to a "whatever-it-takes"" approach to stifle the flow of in-
formation to a pregnant woman, whether as part of a legislative scheme
to ensure informed consent,'" or from private citizens, compelled by their
conscience and moral convictions to save the lives of unborn children."P
No legal rule or doctrine has been safe from "ad hoc nullification"'" in
defense of the "sacred cow" of abortion. The most recent example of this
has been the case of Hill v. Colorado.'"
A new form of Iron Curtain called a "bubble zone,"' 6 has invaded
the traditional public forum of city sidewalks, insulating any unwilling
listener from any speaker who might prick another's conscience by say-
ing in ordinary civil conversation that abortion is a moral evil and the
unjust killing of innocent human life. According to Justice Scalia, "There
is apparently no end to the distortion of our First Amendment law that
the Court is willing to endure in order to sustain this restriction upon the
free speech of abortion opponents."'" The suppression of one-to-one con-
versations on the topic of persuading women contemplating abortion that
killing unborn babies is wrong is the core speech made illegal by a Su-
preme Court bent on preserving the "sacred cow" of abortion, even if the
Court's reasoning flies in the face of traditional First Amendment princi-
ples and values.
The right to be let alone is meaningless unless put into context.
There are different species of the right to be let alone.'" In this essay,
11. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 762 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760
(1986). "[T]he State may not require the delivery of information designed 'to influence the woman's
informed choice between abortion or childbirth."' City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
13. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 380 (1997) (upholding the provisions
of the district court's injunction imposing 15-foot "fixed buffer zones around the doorways,
driveways, and driveway entrances" of abortion facilities); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (holding "that the establishment of a 36-foot buffer zone on a public street
from which demonstrators are excluded passes muster under the First Amendment").
14. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision goes further,
and makes it painfully clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this
Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion.");
see also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
15. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
16. Also known as buffer zones. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 361.
17. Hill, 530 U.S. at 753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1434 (1992).
Gormley summarized the types of privacy as follows:
Species #1: The right to be let alone, with respect to the acquisition and dissemination of
information concerning the person, particularly through unauthorized publication,
photography or other media. (Warren & Brandeis's original privacy tort).
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freedom from speech is assumed to be the value cherished by the un-
willing listener. Silence is golden. What the unwilling listener wants to
be free from is hearing moral messages when walking on a public side-
walk on the way into a place where abortions take place.
Since there is a legal right to an abortion, I assume a woman who
plans to exercise this option may feel entitled to a portable zone of per-
sonal autonomy and a sealed conscience that may not be disturbed. Such
an island of tranquility is vital to any woman who is unwilling to venture
into the hurricane of controversy swirling about her decision to abort.
Being in the eye of the hurricane brings only temporary respite, as the
societal issue of abortion is bigger than any one individual, and eventu-
ally engulfs any woman who is contemplating or has undergone an abor-
tion.
Another underlying premise in the right to be let alone is the "me"
generation's freedom to choose to "tune in" or to "tune out."" The desire
to control one's environment from incoming communications requires
the suppression of unwelcome communications that make one feel un-
comfortable or annoyed. The solution is an invisible portable cone of
silence, similar in theory to the silly visible one Secret Agent Maxwell
Smart put over his head to isolate himself in conversations with
"Chief."2°
Another benefit from the right to be let alone is freedom from in-
convenient interruptions of planned activities.' People are in a hurry, and
taking the time to talk is an old fashioned practice from an earlier time
known to the generation of old timers who used to watcti on black and
Species #2: The right to be let alone, with respect to governmental searches and seizures
which invade a sphere of individual solitude deemed reasonable by society. (Fourth
Amendment privacy).
Species #3: The right to be let alone, when one individbal's freedom of speech threatens
to disrupt another citizen's liberty of thought and repose. (First Amendment privacy).
Species #4: The right to be let alone, with respect to fundamental (often unanticipated)
decisions concerning the individual's own person, which are explicitly or implicitly
reserved to the citizen (rather than ceded to the government) by the terms of the social
contract. (Fourteenth Amendment privacy).
Species #5: The right to be let alone, with respect to a variety of private and
governmental intrusions generally overlapping with species number one through number
four above, yet often extending greater protections to the citizen by virtue of independent
state constitutional provisions. (State constitutional privacy).
Id.
19. "Tune in, tune out," were typical attitudes adopted by the Hippies of the 1960's, who
advocated casual promiscuous sex outside of marriage.
20. The name of this comedy TV series was Get Smart (NBC 1965-69, CBS 1969-70).
21. I have "miles to go before I sleep," writes poet Robert Frost. ROBERT FROST, Stopping by
Woods on a Snowy Evening, in SELECTED POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 140, 140 (1963). The last thing
some people want is to be interrupted with a message they do not want to receive.
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white televisions, Andy, Opie, Aunt Bee and Barney - those lovable
characters who inhabited the make-believe Southern town of Mayberry."
I further assume that freedom from ideas that deeply offend fixed
positions on moral and spiritual issues influencing personal choice is yet
another reason why the content of a message disapproving of abortion is
so vigorously resisted.
Fear and insecurity is at the heart of the unwilling listener, whose
hardened resolve to go through with an abortion may melt in response to
a message of love, support and concern from a stranger who has nothing
to gain. The easiest way to overcome vulnerability is to hear only mes-
sages that say what you want to hear, and to block those messages that
you fear will change your mind. When a prominent leader of the abortion
cause like Dr. Bernard Nathanson,23 and a poster-child, like Norma
McCorvey, ' the Jane Roe of Roe v. Wade fame, repent of their pro-
choice actions and beliefs, and become ardent pro-lifers, there is good
reason to fear the "sacred cow" of abortion will soon be slaughtered.
This essay will examine the tension between the law of privacy and
First Amendment jurisprudence. The public forum will be defined. What
Hill decided will be discussed. The question of freedom from speech and
the legal limits to free speech will be examined. I will then discuss the
principles and values at the core of the First Amendment and the essen-
tial role it serves to make democracy function. Next, the impact of Hill
on the First Amendment will be discussed. I will then review the rise of
the right to be let alone in First Amendment jurisprudence. The law es-
tablishing that there is no right to be let alone in the public forum will be
reviewed. The question of protected and unprotected speech, and the
content of those messages, will be discussed. I will then evaluate whether
there is a constitutional right to be let alone. The First Amendment abor-
tion line of cases' will then be evaluated to see if there is indeed a "dis-
tortion" in the constitutional jurisprudence that requires fixing, and what
damage, if any, was done to the First Amendment by those cases. The
22. The Andy Griffith Show (CBS 1960-68), is known for the moral values it imparted to
viewers.
23. Co-founder in 1969 of the organization that became known as the National Abortion and
Reproductive Rights Action League (NARRAL), and a physician who personally presided over
60,000 abortions, Dr. Nathanson converted from Judaism to Roman Catholicism. BERNARD
NATHANSON, M.D., THE HAND OF GOD: A JOURNEY FROM DEATH TO LIFE BY THE ABORTION
DOCTOR WHO CHANGED His MIND (1996) (describing his journey from abortion provider to pro-life
advocate).
24. McCorvey, who had been a hard-core supporter of abortion rights, worked at a Dallas
abortion clinic and engaged in personal conversations with Rev. Phillip Benson, leader of the
Operation Rescue office next door to the clinic. Eventually she accepted an invitation to attend
church and was later baptized by Benson. She is now a pro-life activist and has started her own
ministry called "Roe No More." She now prays for pro-choice leaders to repent. Her story is
available at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998roe.wadestoiesroe.profile.
25. See cases cited supra notes 4-5.
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issue of supremacy between privacy and free speech will be then as-
sessed in my conclusion.
I conclude that more free speech is the answer, not less, on the issue
of abortion. I agree with Justices Scalia and Thomas that there is no con-
stitutional principle shielding an unwilling listener from moral or other
messages in the public forum.26 I further agree with Professor Haiman
that the law should not protect the unwilling listener from the initial im-
pact of any kind of communication in the public forum.27 I also conclude
that Roe v. Wade' is bad constitutional law, and must be overruled to
prevent further injury to First Amendment jurisprudence. 29 If the Court
remains faithful to current abortion law precedents, the ripple effect from
cases like Hill will turn into a tidal wave, destroying the free speech
rights of unionists, environmentalists, political activists, conscientious
objectors and evangelists.
The solution is to place the burden of tolerating free speech in the
public forum upon the listener as a reasonable price to pay to live in a
free and democratic society. There are enough civil and criminal sanc-
tions already in the law to deal with zealots who refuse to cease and de-
sist. Creating the law of the "sacred cow" was unnecessary and a huge
mistake. A legal system that worked was already in place. Perpetuating
the law of the "sacred cow" will aggravate the errors of Roe and make a
bad case like Lochner v. New York"5 look good to future law students.
II. THE PUBLIC FORUM
The focus of this discussion is the collision between the constitu-
tional right to freedom of speech and the desire to be left alone in the
26. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 752 (2000).
27. See Franklyn Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To? 67 Nw.
U. L. REV. 153, 193 (1972) (theorizing that "the law should not attempt to insulate any persons in
our society, no matter how willing or unwilling an audience they may be, from the initial impact of
any kind of communication, but that the law should protect their right to escape from a continued
bombardment by that communication if they wish to be free from it."); but see Alan Brownstein,
Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected
Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1163, 1172-73 (1996) (arguing that
speech targeted at the unwilling listener is blatant harassment).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. See Thomburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793-94
(1986) (White, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the values animating the Constitution
do not compel recognition of the abortion liberty as fundamental. In so denominating that liberty, the
Court engages not in constitutional interpretation, but in the unrestrained imposition of its own,
extraconstitutional value preferences."); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 787-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(linking the destruction of free speech to the Court's self-serving defense of illegitimate abortion
rights: "Laws punishing speech which protests the lawfulness or the morality of the government's
own policy are the essence of the tyrannical power the First Amendment guards against ... Absent
the ability to ask the government to intervene, citizens who oppose abortion must seek to convince
their fellow citizens of the moral imperative of their cause ... What the statute restricts is one person
trying to communicate to another, which ought to be the heart of civilized discourse.").
30. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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traditional public forum." The specific public forums discussed in this
essay are public streets and sidewalks. "Streets" were referred to by Jus-
tice Roberts in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization:
32
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemo-
rially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use
of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privi-
lege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in
the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exer-
cised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied."
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,' Justice
Marshall included "sidewalks" when he referred to Hague and other
cases in support of the general proposition that "streets, sidewalks, parks,
and other similar public places are so historically associated with the
exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of
exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and ab-
solutely."" It is beyond dispute that a public sidewalk, even in front of
the Supreme Court building itself, is a public forum where any person
has a general First Amendment right to speak.36
I11. WHAT HILL DECIDED
Abortion is unquestionably a public issue debated with vigor and
passion between individuals who hold differing views. It is the classic
exercise of freedom of speech. Communicating thoughts by opening
conversations with strangers on the public sidewalks heading toward
entrances. to abortion clinics has now been outlawed by Hill unless the
intended recipient is willing to listen. Without deciding that there exists
a constitutional right to be free from unpopular speech in a public forum,
Justice Stevens balanced the interests of unwilling listeners against the
constitutional right of free speech, and upheld the legality of an eight-
31. See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37. 45-46 (1983)
(identifying three types of public forum: the traditional public forum; the public forum created by
public designation; and the non-public forum).
32. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
33. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16 (emphasis added).
34. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
35. Amalgamated Food 391 U.S. at 315.
36. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1983).
37. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703. 728 (2000).
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foot bubble zone." In so doing, he severed personal speech from de-
tached speech.39
As a result, some types of personal conduct, such as the arm's
length handing out of pamphlets, were eliminated. Equally devastating
was the end of personal speech and the loss of meaningful opportunities
for quiet interpersonal conversations that once facilitated the creation of
rapport between the sidewalk counselor (the initiator of the conversa-
tion), and the pregnant mother, the recipient.
What Justice Stevens left intact was detached speech, conducted
outside the bubble zone, in the form of picket signs and bullhorns. De-
tached speech functions well as a demonstration of belief, but it is an
ineffective and counterproductive means of persuading individuals that
abortion is a moral evil for which viable alternatives exist. Shouts of
"baby killer" from outside a bubble zone will only relieve the frustration
of insensitive fanatics, who might otherwise use a gun or bomb against
abortionists. Unfortunately, these remarks only increase the desire of
pregnant women to be left alone from such idiotic (and counterproduc-
tive) behavior.
Predictably, the next legal weapon against anti-abortion demon-
strators will be a law against excessive noise originating outside the pe-
rimeter of a bubble zone. Patients at medical facilities are entitled to
peace and quiet, to alleviate health risks and promote psychological
health.' However, a prior restraint on First Amendment rights, which
attempts to lessen the psychological harm that might be inflicted on an
intended class of persons, may be unlawful, especially where a means of
escaping the anticipated harm is available by notice and location.'
IV. REASONABLE LIMITS TO FREE SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC FORUM
The Supreme Court has been willing to sanction state and municipal
laws creating reasonable time, place and manner regulations that limit
free speech irrespective of content.2 The Court has prohibited blaring
38. See Hill 530 U.S. at 729-30.
39. See Darrin Alan Hostetler, Face-to-Face with the First Amendment: Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network and the Right to "Approach and Offer" in Abortion Clinic Protests, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 179, 204 (1997) (defining personal and detached speech).
40. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 437 U.S. 483, 509 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)
Hospitals, after all, are not factories or mines or assembly plants. They are hospitals,
where human ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under
emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets
of the day's activity, and where the patient and his family irrespective of whether that
patient and that family are labor or management oriented -- need a restful, uncluttered,
relaxing, and helpful atmosphere, rather than one remindful of the tensions of the
marketplace in addition to the tensions of the sickbed.
41. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
42. See Erznosnik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
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sound from loudspeakers mounted on trucks roaming city streets at
night,"3 upheld an anti-noise ordinance silencing civil rights demonstra-
tions on a public sidewalk outside a senior high school," and affirmed the
right of the City of New York to control the amplified volume of raucous
rock concerts in Central Park. 5 When the Court in Public Utilities Com-
mission v. Pollak"6 permitted a street railroad company to broadcast mu-
sic and commercials from radio programs, which enhanced the public
transit experience for a majority of its riders, 7 Justice Black drew the line
at the broadcasting of news, public speeches, views, or propaganda of
any kind.48 Justice Douglas delivered a powerful dissent, basing his
opinion on the right to be let alone. He stated:
The case comes down to the meaning of "liberty" as used in the Fifth
Amendment. Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include pri-
vacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let
alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. Part of our claim to pri-
vacy is in the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment against unreason-
able searches and seizures. It gives the guarantee that a man's home is
his castle beyond invasion either by inquisitive or by officious peo-
ple. A man loses that privacy of course when he goes upon the streets
or enters public places. But even in his activities outside the home he
has immunities from controls bearing on privacy. He may not be
compelled against his will to attend a religious service; he may not be
forced to make an affirmation or observe a ritual that violates his
scruples; he may not be made to accept one religious, political, or
philosophical creed as against another. Freedom of religion and free-
dom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment give more than
the privilege to worship, to write, to speak as one chooses; they give
freedom not to do nor to act as the government chooses. The First
Amendment in its respect for the conscience of the individual honors
the sanctity of thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe
what one wishes are important aspects of the constitutional right to
be let alone. If we remembered this lesson taught by the First
Amendment, I do not believe we would construe "liberty" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment as narrowly as the Court does. The
present case involves a form of coercion to make people listen. The
listeners are of course in a public place; they are on streetcars trav-
eling to and from home. In one sense it can be said that those who
ride the streetcars do so voluntarily. Yet in a practical sense they are
forced to ride, since this mode of transportation is today essential for
many thousands. Compulsion which comes from circumstances can
be as real as compulsion which comes from a command. The streetcar
audience is a captive audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not
43. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949).
44. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972).
45. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989).
46. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
47. See Pub. Uril. Comm'n, 343 U.S. at 465-66.
48. See id. at 469 (Black, J.. dissenting).
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of choice. One who is in a public vehicle may not of course complain
of the noise of the crowd and the babble of tongues. One who enters
any public place sacrifices some of his privacy. My protest is against
the invasion of his privacy over and beyond the risks of travel. One
who tunes in on an offensive program at home can turn it off or tune
in another station, as he wishes. One who hears disquieting or un-
pleasant programs in public places, such as restaurants, can get up
and leave. But the man on the streetcar has no choice but to sit and
listen, or perhaps to sit and to try not to listen. When we force people
to listen to another's ideas, we give the propagandist a powerful
weapon. Today it is a business enterprise working out a radio pro-
gram under the auspices of government. Tomorrow it may be a domi-
nant political or religious group. Today the purpose is benign; there is
no invidious cast to the programs. But the vice is inherent in the sys-
tem. Once privacy is invaded, privacy is gone. Once a man is forced
to submit to one type of radio program, he can be forced to submit to
another. It may be but a short step from a cultural program to a politi-
cal program. If liberty is to flourish, government should never be al-
lowed to force people to listen to any radio program. The right of pri-
vacy should include the right to pick and choose from competing en-
tertainments, competing propaganda, competing political philoso-
phies. If people are let alone in those choices, the right of privacy will
pay dividends in character and integrity. The strength of our system is
in the dignity, the resourcefulness, and the independence of our peo-
ple. Our confidence is in their ability as individuals to make the wis-
est choice. That system cannot flourish if regimentation takes hold.
The right of privacy, today violated, is a powerful deterrent to anyone
who would control men's minds.49
Justice Douglas' ideas of captivity and the right to be let alone have
taken root, and on the surface, lend themselves well to the bubble zone
issue, as pregnant women seeking an abortion may have to travel on a
public sidewalk to enter a clinic and inevitably face the prospect of con-
frontation with shouting pro-lifers exercising their lungs and their con-
stitutional free speech rights. During the height of the Operation Rescue
movement in the early 1990's,' getting into an abortion clinic was the
49. Id. at 467-69 (emphasis added).
50. See http://www.altculture.com.index/aentries/o/operationx.html.
(describing the rise and fall of Operation Rescue):
Antiabortion group that radicalized the pro-life movement of the late '80s and early '90s through
mammoth clinic blockades and rhetoric equating abortion with murder and the Holocaust. Randall
Terry (b. 1959), who founded OR [Operation Rescue] in 1987 while working as a used-car salesman
in upstate New York, is credited with originating anti-abortion civil disobedience and militancy. The
group's protests first came to the country's attention at the 1988 Democratic National Convention in
Atlanta and peaked with the 46-day shutdown of Wichita, Kansas, in 1991. Three years later, OR
was in splinters. In a single month (May 1994), RU-486 was licensed for U.S. production, the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act was signed into law, and a Houston jury ordered OR
members to pay $1 million in punitive damages for a 1992 blockade of a local Planned Parenthood
clinic. The Catholic Church also began to grow wary of the sidewalk counseling, surveillance,
blockade, and harassment tactics taught at the group's Melbourne, Florida, training center. After
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modem day equivalent of running the gauntlet in medieval times. How-
ever, those days are long over, and the faithful few who continue to
maintain lonely vigils outside abortion clinics typically have different
credentials. Leila Hill, the petitioner in Hill, is one of these faithful few.
Ms. Hill, a paralegal and former obstetrics nurse, joined with others to
form a group which provided education about the risks of abortion to
pregnant women.' They called themselves "Sidewalk Counselors For
Life."52 Their behavior was impeccable, leading Justice Stevens to con-
clude that the sidewalk counseling conducted by Leila Hill and her fel-
low petitioners was neither abusive nor confrontational.53
It may be helpful to put Justice Douglas' dissent in Pollak into per-
spective.' Justice Douglas wrote this dissent during the Cold War when
the threat of communism spawned McCarthyism. Americans were wary
of mind control, and movies such as The Manchurian Candidate5 exem-
plified the paranoia of the day. Radio broadcasts from Moscow and from
the Voice of American fought ideological warfare on the short-wave
band. To import Justice Douglas' reasoning now into the abortion debate
takes it out of the context for which it was authored.
Minneapolis was selected by OR in 1993 as one of seven 'cities of refuge,' the archbishop there
explicitly asked OR to stay away. The March 1993 murder of Florida doctor David Gunn led to a
split between those condoning and condemning the violence--Terry left OR for the militia-affiliated
United States Taxpayers Party, while some of the group's most strident leaders formed the American
Coalition of Life Activists, a group that in 1995 published a 'Deadly Dozen' list targeting 12
American abortion doctors for harassment. By the mid-'90s, the internally divided OR had lost
considerable visibility.
51. See Brian W. Oberst, Buffering Free Speech: An Examination of the Impact of Colorado's
Buffer Zone Law on Protected Speech after Hill v. Colorado, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 89, 90 (2000)
(discussing Leila Hill and her "Sidewalk Counselors For Life" group).
52. Id.
53. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 752 (2000).
54. See Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1952).
55. Roger Ebert wrote a glowing review of the movie, giving it the maximum rating of four
stars. Here is part of the review:
Here is a movie that was made in 1962, and it feels as if it were made yesterday. Not a
moment of THE MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE lacks edge and tension and a cynical
spin-and what's even more surprising is how the film now plays as a political comedy, as
well as a thriller. After being suppressed for a quarter of a century, after becoming an
unseen legend that never turned up on TV or on home video, John Frankenheimer's 1962
,.masterpiece now re-emerges as one of the best and brightest of modem American films.
The story is a matter of many levels, some of them frightening, some pointed with
satirical barbs. In a riveting opening sequence, a group of American combat infantrymen
are shown being brainwashed by a confident Chinese communist hypnotist, who has
them so surely under his control that one man is ordered to strangle one of his buddies
and shoot another in the head, and cheerfully complies. Two members of the group get
our special attention: the characters played by Frank Sinatra and Laurence Harvey.
Harvey seems to be the main target of the Chinese scheme, which is to return him to
American society as a war hero, and then allow him to lead a normal life until he is
triggered by a buried hypnotic suggestion, and turned into an assassin completely
brainwashed to take orders from his enemy controller.
See http://www.sharf.com/jennie/lansbury/manchur/ebert.html.
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Justice Black observed the need for limits to free speech to combat
noisy demonstrations in his opinion in Gregory v. Chicago:6
No mandate in our Constitution leaves States and governmental units
powerless to pass laws to protect the public from the kind of boister-
ous and threatening conduct that disturbs the tranquility of spots se-
lected by the people either for homes, wherein they can escape the
hurly-burly of the outside business and political world, or for public
and other buildings that require peace and quiet to carry out their
functions, such as courts, libraries, schools, and hospitals.57
The alternative to control, feared Justice Black, was to sow the seeds of
anarchy:
Were the authority of government so trifling as to permit anyone with
a complaint to have the vast power to do anything he pleased, wher-
ever he pleased, and whenever he pleased, our customs and our habits
of conduct, social, political, economic, ethical, and religious, would
all be wiped out, and become no more than relics of a gone but not
forgotten past. Churches would be compelled to welcome into their
buildings invaders who came but to scoff and jeer; streets and high-
ways and public buildings would cease to be available for the pur-
poses for which they were constructed and dedicated whenever dem-
onstrators and picketers wanted to use them for their own purposes.
And perhaps worse than all other changes, homes, the sacred retreat
to which families repair for their privacy and their daily way of liv-
ing, would have to have their doors thrown open to all who desired to
convert the occupants to new views, new morals, and a new way of
life. Men and women who hold public office would be compelled,
simply because they did hold public office, to lose the comforts and
privacy of an unpicketed home. I believe that our Constitution, writ-
ten for the ages, to endure except as changed in the manner it pro-
vides, did not create a government with such monumental weak-
nesses. Speech and press are, of course, to be free, so that public
matters can be discussed with impunity. But picketing and demon-
strating can be regulated like other conduct of men. I believe that the
homes of men, sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and
the sick, can be protected by government from noisy, marching,
tramping, threatening picketers and demonstrators bent on filling the
minds of men, women, and children with fears of the unknown. "
It is a small incremental step to arrest anti-abortionists clamoring
too loudly outside of a bubble zone. For example, in the first six months
after its enactment, Baptist evangelists in Beaufort, South Carolina, were
the only persons prosecuted for violating a local anti-noise ordinance for
56. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
57. Gregory, 394 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
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raising their voices above the ordinary din of road and sidewalk traffic. 9
Dozens of seminary students have been arrested for the crime of preach-
ing the gospel too loudly with their unaided voices outside the businesses
of local merchants.' The content of the offending speech expressed
moral views against abortion, immorality, homosexuality, and alcohol
abuse.' Such restrictions on sidewalk and street corner preaching are not
isolated events. 2
The right to be let alone from detached speech will thus be easily
accomplished by the application of existing jurisprudence.
All of this may be a pyrrhic victory, now that the availability of the
abortion pill RU-486"3 has potentially changed the location of most abor-
tions from the clinic to the privacy of the home.
The price for all this is has been the evisceration of the First
Amendment. It is worth re-visiting the basic values and principles of
First Amendment jurisprudence just to see how high that price has been.
V. THE VALUES AND PRINCIPLES AT THE CORE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Debate on public issues as a matter of general principle should be
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open."' In public debate, people "must
tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide 'ade-
quate breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amend-
ment." The idea is that the "the best test of truth is the power of the
59. See Patrick J. Flynn, Street Preachers Versus Merchants: Will the First Amendment be
Held Captive in the Balance?, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 613, 649 (1995).
60. See id. at 613.
61. See id. at 642.
62. See e.g., Eanes v. State, 569 A.2d 604 (Md. 1992); Marks v. Florida, No. 91-1989 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); City of Beaufort v. Baker, 432 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1993).
63. The following summary explaining RU-486 was taken from a Canadian web site:
The medication "mifepristone" was invented in France by Dr. Etienne-Emile Baulieu in
1980. It is widely know as "RU-486" throughout North America. The letters are taken
from the initials of the pharmaceutical company Roussel-Uclaf. The "486" is an arbitrary
lab serial number. It was first introduced in France, where it is called Mifegyne. It has
been used, in combination with prostaglandin medication, to induce abortions in about
500,000 women over almost 2 decades.
Danco Laboratories, the U.S., distributor expected to be selling the pill in the U.S. by the
end of 1999. That did not happen. The FDA finally approved the pill for U.S. distribution
on September 28, 2000. It will be distributed under the name "Early Option Pill." In the
U.S. RU-486 is to be taken within 49 days after the start of the last menstrual period. It is
an antiprogestin. It binds itself to progesterone receptors on the wall of the uterus thus
blocking the effect of the woman's natural progesterone. This triggers the shedding of the
uterine wall, much like a normal period. RU-486 also opens the cervix, and causes mild
contractions which help expel the embryo. The initial dose often causes some nausea,
headache, weakness, diarrhea and/or fatigue. It may be taken at home up to the end of the
first seven weeks of pregnancy.
http://www.religioustolerance.org/aboru486.htm.
64. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270(1964).
65. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (citing Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
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thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . ."' Fur-
ther, "[s]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it
is the essence of self-government. '6 7 The Supreme Court has stated,
"[t]he freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all
matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment." 8 The Court has also added, "[s]peech does not lose its
protected character, however, simply because it may embarrass others or
coerce them into action." 9 Unpopular views peacefully communicated in
a public forum may not be criminalized. Provided the means of com-
munication are peaceful, the message itself need not meet standards of
public acceptability.71 Democracy requires the personal communication
of diverse ideas without fear of repression and criminal sanctions:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to in-
vite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces
a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
That is why freedom of speech ... is ... protected against censorship or
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present dan-
ger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconven-
ience, annoyance, or unrest. . . . There is no room under our Constitu-
tion for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant
political or community groups.2
A total ban on conversational speech on a public sidewalk within a
bubble zone on the perimeter of an abortion clinic is outright unconstitu-
tional censorship discriminating against opponents of abortion.7 3 This
kind of suppression is not just a facial violation of the First Amendment;
it cuts out the core of what it means to be an American. Justices Brandeis
and Holmes, concurring in Whitney v. California,7 ' believed that free
speech was the foundation of liberty:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its
66. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
67. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
68. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940).
69. NAACP v. Clairbome Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).
70. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963).
71. See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
72. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4-5 (1949).
73. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J. concurring) (stating that picking
and choosing which views may be discussed in a public forum is "censorship of the most odious
form.").
74. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed lib-
erty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of lib-
erty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of po-
litical truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate pro-
tection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a po-
litical duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. They recognized the risks to which all human
institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazard-
ous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds re-
pression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable gov-
ernment; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fit-
ting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of
reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
coerced by law -- the argument of force in its worst form. Recogniz-
ing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended
the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaran-
teed. "
Suppression of freedom of speech inevitably sets off a chain reac-
tion of events that culminates in growing social unrest until violence
erupts. Sidewalk counselors view their moral imperative as a mission to
expose the fallacies and falsehoods of abortion and to overcome its evil
by education and compassion through intimate personal conversation.
More speech is the answer, not enforced silence. Laws that silence the
voices of quiet conversationalists is evidence of the cowardice of those
who fear judicial reversal of Roe and the influence of the sidewalk coun-
selors. Repression of sidewalk counselors can never be justified in a truly
democratic society:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards.
They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost
of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the
power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of
popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed
clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discus-
sion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emer-
gency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to
75. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (emphasis added).
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be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of
the Constitution.76
Whether or not bubble zone laws purport to be neutral, in reality
these laws impact only pro-life advocates. The net result is that judges
and governments control what ideas can be publicly debated, where,
when, how, and by what means. This practice offends not only the First
Amendment, but the Fourteenth as well:
... under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing
to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not
select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facili-
ties. There is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and govern-
ment must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups,
government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on
the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a pub-
lic forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified
by reference to content alone. "
Bubble zone laws, created by judicial injunction or by legislative
ordinance are the latest tools to take away the constitutional right of a
person to approach another in the public forum and offer an idea that
may or may not be welcomed. This is an attack on democracy itself:
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essen-
tial to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system. "
VI. IMPACT OF HILL ON ESTABLISHED FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND
FREEDOMS
If Hill was correctly decided, then Martin v. Struthers79 is in grave
jeopardy. In Martin, the Supreme Court weighed the competing interests
between members of the Jehovah Witnesses' faith who exercised their
faith by residential door-to-door canvassing, and the privacy rights of the
occupants of residential dwellings to be left alone from the nuisance of
the moral message.
The relevance of Martin is immediately apparent. It is trite to say
that until the door was opened to the visitor, it was generally impossible
to know in advance whether the offer to engage in conversation about
76. Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
77. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (emphasis added).
78. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
79. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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religion would result in a willing listener, who might accept a leaflet or
an invitation to attend church. This situation is no different in principle
from the dilemma faced by the sidewalk counselor, who has no idea how
to identify a willing listener, without first risking a violation of a bubble
zone law which prohibits the approach of an offer to talk to an unwilling
listener.
In Martin, a divided Court struck down the municipal ordinance that
protected residents from religious proselytizing. Justice Frankfurter dis-
sented, recognizing that homes are sanctuaries from intrusions upon pri-
vacy and a place of rest from the stress of modem urban life." Justices
Roberts and Jackson joined Justice Reed in his dissent. He stated:
No ideas are being suppressed. No censorship is involved. The free-
dom to teach or preach by word or book is unabridged, save only the
right to call a householder to the door of his house to receive the
summoner's message. I cannot expand this regulation to a violation of
the First Amendment.'
This argument is hauntingly familiar to that of the majority in Hill.
Justice Reed further suggested that the mere passage of time can
result in the loss of a constitutional freedom that has fallen into disuse:
The antiquity and prevalence of colportage are relied on to support
the Court's decision. But the practice has persisted because the
householder was acquiescent. It can hardly be thought, however, that
long indulgence of a practice which many or all citizens have wel-
comed or tolerated creates a constitutional right to its continuance.
Changing conditions have begotten modification by law of many
practices once deemed a part of the individual's liberty.82
Assuming that the householder no longer was acquiescent to col-
portage, Justice Reed thought it was appropriate for the municipality to
regulate its practice.
Of significance is a line in the dissent that refutes any attempt by
Justice Stevens in Hill to characterize the unwilling recipient of commu-
nication as a "captive audience." Justice Reed wrote, "[t]he First
Amendment does not compel a pedestrian to pause on the street to listen
to the argument supporting another's views of religion or politics."83 In
other words, the pregnant woman who is unwilling to listen can simply
walk away. It's as simple as that. The burden is light on the unwilling
listener, who in Martin, had only to shut the door or refuse to open it, and
the pedestrian in Hill, who could just keep on walking without a response
and be in the clinic in a matter of seconds.
80. See Martin, 319 U.S. at 152-53.
81. Id. at 154-55.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 157.
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What Martin represents is that freedom and democracy demands
nothing less than the right to exercise freedom of speech and the free
exercise of religion. In a collision between the notion that a man's home
is his castle, and religious freedom, there must be an accommodation of
both privacy and freedom of speech."' A blanket law forbidding all at-
tempts to initiate a conversation will affect both the willing and the un-
willing listener. It is not for the Court or for the legislature or city hall to
decide this issue on a uniform basis. It is the province of the person who
receives the invitation to converse to decide for himself or herself
whether or not to be a willing listener. In Martin, Justice Black framed
the issue in the same manner:
We are faced in the instant case with the necessity of weighing the
conflicting interests of the appellant in the civil rights she claims, as
well as the right of the individual householder to determine whether
he is willing to receive her message, against the interest of the com-
munity which by this ordinance offers to protect the interests of all of
its citizens, whether particular citizens want that protection or not.
The ordinance does not control anything but the distribution of lit-
erature, and in that respect it substitutes the judgment of the commu-
nity for the judgment of the individual householder. It submits the
distributer to criminal punishment for annoying the person on whom
he calls, even though the recipient of the literature distributed is in
fact glad to receive it. 5
The First Amendment is rooted in the dissemination of ideas. Tak-
ing away the choice of the potential listener by silencing the potential
speaker is the aborting of free speech. A free society cannot tolerate a
bubble zone muzzling conversations, just as it would not take away the
right of homeowners in Martin of their responsibility to think for them-
selves and to make their own decision to communicate with the visitor at
their door." The Martin Court stated:
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he de-
sires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free soci-
ety that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time
and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The dangers of
distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods,
leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will
receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no
purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction
of the dissemination of ideas.'7
84. See id. at 150.
85. See id. at 143-44 (emphasis added).
86. See id. at 146-47.
87. Id.
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In the aftermath of Hill, an inevitable challenge will be mounted at
some point to reverse Martin. When that happens, there will be a great
outcry from angry civil libertarians who will regret the judgment in Hill.
The future validity of Marsh v. Alabama88 is also in doubt. In Hill,
the Court used property law zoning as a model to create a bubble zone in
a public forum, in essence forbidding trespassing into a zoned territory to
offer a moral message. A property rights approach89 not only elevates an
abortion clinic, a commercial business, to the status of a private resi-
dence, it intrudes into the public forum. An apt comparison is the com-
pany town that was the subject of First Amendment litigation in Marsh
by a member of the Jehovah Witnesses, who was convicted of distribut-
ing religious literature without company permission on the public side-
walk near the post office.' When a legal permit to distribute religious
literature had been sought earlier, the company rejected the request.9'
Justice Black's view of freedom prevailed, reversing the conviction.
The right to freedom of religion outweighed the property rights at issue.92
To be good citizens, people needed to be informed. To be properly in-
formed, the information must be uncensored.9
The analogy to sidewalk counseling is obvious. The choice to abort
requires full and informed consent. Censorship of views against abortion
eliminate the possibility of making a fully informed decision. Abortion
clinic owners are hostile to the message of pro-life supporters, and it
would be bad for business to allow clients of a clinic to receive this mes-
sage prior to an abortion. The absence of pro-life counselors invited in-
side abortion clinics for the purpose of dissuading pregnant mothers from
having an abortion makes the point.
In his dissent in Marsh, Justice Reed suggested the proper course
was to remove the speaker off the sidewalk freely used by the public,
which was on company "property" and onto the public highway," which
was 30 feet away95 from the contested location. The effect of this form of
a "bubble zone" is to prohibit a close encounter with anyone entering or
exiting the post office. The parallel with Justice Souter's reasoning in
Hill is remarkable.96
The Court's historical defense of the communication of moral mes-
sages on public sidewalks was a result of the First Amendment being
88. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
89. See Mark Cordes, Property and the First Amendment, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1997);
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood. 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
90. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503.
91. See id. at 503.
92. See id. at 509.
93. See id. at 508.
94. Id. at 517.
95. Id. at 514.
96. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 738-40 (2000).
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regarded as a preferred constitutional right. Religious freedom and free
speech were presumed to have a superior position over privacy, which at
that time was not granted the present constitutional status it now enjoys.
VII. THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
Things began to change in a series of First Amendment cases in
which the Court ruled against door-to-door magazine salesmen,97 the ad-
vertisement of tobacco products,98 the advertisement of election cam-
paign propaganda on a public transit system," the broadcasting of a vul-
gar social satire on commercial radio,"'" the delivery to private homes of
junk mail tending to corrupt public morals,'"' the curtailment of the ac-
tions of members of a religious cult which aggressively solicited money
and converts at limited public forums,' 2 and a state fair."' This line of
cases is distinguishable from Martin and Marsh, insofar as these other
cases did not involve the communication of a moral message in a tradi-
tional public forum.
In Rowan v. United States Post Office,"'4 the right of every person to
be let alone from unwanted mail was placed on the scales with the right
of others to communicate."' Every advertiser had the opportunity to
communicate once with a homeowner, but thereafter the recipient could
ask the Post Office to block further unwanted communications."'6 The
Court upheld this freedom to be let alone, holding that "no one has a
right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient.""'7 A person
was permitted to erect a wall on the outer boundary of his residential
domain so that no repeat advertiser might further penetrate without the
prior consent of the intended recipient.'"'
In Frisby v. Schultz,"'° the home of an abortion provider was given
protection from anti-abortion demonstrators."' To Justice O'Connor, the
97. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
98. See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932). Justice Brandeis did his best to use his
position on the Supreme Court to push his concept of the right to be let alone. In 1932, a Utah statute
banning tobacco ads from billboards throughout the state was upheld as a legitimate limitation on
commercial free speech. The unwilling observer, claimed Brandeis, was unable to avert his eyes
from unwelcome ads on public signs, which, unlike a radio, could not be turned off. See id.
99. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
100. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
101. See Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
102. See Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Board of Airport
Comm'rs. v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
103. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
104. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
105. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
106. See id. at 729.
107. Id. at 738.
108. See id.
109. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
110. See Frisby, 487 U.S. 474.
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home was a refuge from intrusive offensive speech."' The privacy of the
unwilling residential listener who was trapped or was hiding in his or her
home prevailed over the constitutional free speech rights of demonstra-
tors on the public sidewalks and streets in front of private residences."
2
Justice Brennan dissented in Frisby, noting that as long as the speech
remained outside the home and did not unduly coerce the occupant, the
government's interest in protecting residential privacy was not impli-
cated."3
VIII. No RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE IN THE PUBLIC FORUM
Going outside the home was another matter, for then the individual
was subject to whatever assaulted his or her senses. "[W]e are often
'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech and other sound ... .""' In a free society, "one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric.""' 5 Where a political message is communicated, even its
vulgar character is to be tolerated as the price for living in a free
society.' 6 Justice Harlan held:
While this Court has recognized that government may properly act in
many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of
unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the
public dialogue. The ability of government, consonant with the Con-
stitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it
is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any
broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority
to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections. In
this regard, persons confronted with Cohen's jacket were in a quite
different posture than, say, those subjected to the raucous emissions
of sound trucks blaring outside their residences. Those in the Los An-
geles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes. "'
Anticipating criticism of his opinion, Justice Harlan added:
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often ap-
pear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance.
These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary side
effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open de-
111. See id. at 484-85.
112. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470-71 (1980).
113. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 492-93 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
114. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
115. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
116. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (discussing that Paul Cohen's jacket displayed the words, "Fuck
the Draft," to express his feelings about conscription and the Vietnam War. While he wore the
garment in the presence of the public in the corridor outside a courtroom, he respectfully removed it
during the time he sat in the courtroom).
117. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
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bate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with
verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of
strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise
might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful
abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly im-
plicated."8
The constitutional principle at the root of not just Paul Cohen's
freedom of speech, but of our freedom of speech, was the right to be let
alone from government control so that democracy could function as it
was intended. There was no alternative if we hoped to live in a free soci-
ety:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ulti-
mately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and
in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise
of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests."9
The right to be let alone, assuming it exists, is from the reach of
government, not the reach of our fellow citizens who desire to impart an
idea for us to consider and debate. We are not to fear new ideas that may
actually benefit us, but fear the evil of government censorship that sup-
presses independent thought in favor of conformity to the party line.
In venturing outside the home onto a city sidewalk, the burden is on
the unwilling viewer to avert his or her eyes, to say "no" and refuse the
offering of unwanted handbills and leaflets, or to physically remove him-
self or herself from the earshot of unwelcome verbal messages.'"
Until Hill v. Colorado,'2 ' the leading case on the tension between the
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy rights of the un-
willing recipient who wished to be let alone, was generally thought to be
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville.12 An "R" rated movie, the "Class of '74," was
shown at a drive-in theater, where scenes of female nudity were exposed
to any member of the public who might chance or desire to catch a scene
of the movie from adjacent property which included two public streets
and a church parking lot.' 3 This resulted in a prosecution under a mu-
nicipal ordinance prohibiting a drive-in theater from showing a movie
118. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
120. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, RALPH S. TYLER, JR., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 948
(2d ed. 1988).
121. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
122. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
123. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 207.
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with scenes of nudity that was visible from a public place or street." The
underlying assumption behind the ordinance was the right of people to be
let alone in the public forum." Churchgoers might be offended by be-
coming unwilling viewers of an "R" rated movie. It was solely the con-
tent of the movie's message that triggered prosecution under the law.' 26 In
striking down the ordinance, the Supreme Court concluded "the limited
privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this cen-
sorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content.'1 '" The
burden was on the unwilling viewer to avert his or her eyes.' 28 It was still
open to a municipality to enact reasonable time, place and manner regu-
lations applicable to all speech regardless of content.'29 In a pluralistic
society, outside of the home, people will encounter politically and mor-
ally offensive forms of free speech.'3" This results in inescapable captivity
in many circumstances. 3' It is the First Amendment that gives priority to
the speaker, leaving the recipient of the communication with the choice
to respond. "The Constitution does not permit [the] government to decide
which types of otherwise protected speech is sufficiently offensive to
require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer."'32 The Court was
careful to note there was no issue about the privacy of persons in their
homes who needed protection from visual or audible intrusions from
movies shown at drive-in theaters.'
3
1
IX. CONTENT OF THE MESSAGE: PROTECTED OR UNPROTECTED?
The distinction between protected and unprotected speech is im-
portant to understand. Those who support the Hill decision of silencing
sidewalk counselors applaud the banning of what they consider unpro-
tected speech. Their argument is that sidewalk counselors fall outside of
First Amendment protection because they utter "fighting words,"'"4 pro-
voke violence'35 or make defamatory statements,'36 such as labeling those
who are a party to abortions as "murderers," resulting in psychological
124. See id. at 206.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 212.
127. Id.
128. Seeid. at210-11.





134. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942). See Laurence J. Eisenstein
& Steven Semeraro, Abortion Clinic Protest and the First Amendment, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REv. 221, 233 (1993); Amber M. Pang, Speech, Conduct, and Regulation of Abortion Protest by
Court Injunction: From Madsen v. Women's Health Center to Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 34
GONZ. L. REv. 201, 226 (1998). The first article was a product of the co-authors' work representing
various organizations and abortion clinics in lawsuits against Operation Rescue.
135. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
136. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-57 (1952).
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trauma to pregnant mothers who are about to fatally harm their fetuses.'"
Pamphlets containing photos of dismembered fetuses and/or normal fe-
tuses handed out to pregnant mothers are no doubt considered obscene'38
and emotionally upsetting by some recipients. The Constitution permits
restrictions on the content of speech that is "of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."" 9 There is, as a
result, a class of speech that can be regulated because of its "constitu-
tionally proscribable content."'" Yet, even vulgar words may be pro-
tected speech when the words have mixed characteristics, for example,
where the form of the message is offensive but the content has social
value, however slight."
"The First Amendment imposes ... a 'content discrimination' limi-
tation upon [the government's] prohibition of proscribable speech."'42
"The government may not regulate [free speech] based on hostility--or
favoritism--toward the underlying message expressed.""' Content-based
restrictions presumptively violate the First Amendment and courts will
not find them constitutionally valid unless the restrictions meet the strict
scrutiny test.'" This means that in a public forum, any restrictions on free
speech must be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ...
narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'45 Otherwise, the government may
"effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."'"
Let us assume that outside the home, an individual might encounter
on the public sidewalk another person who may approach and hand out
religious or anti-abortion literature. If done within a bubble zone without
prior consent, this would be a crime. This is the effect of Hill.'7 Yet in
Lovell v. City of Griffin,'45 the Supreme Court invalidated a municipal
ordinance requiring prior permission to hand out literature.' 9 The Court
declared street literature in the form of pamphlets and leaflets handed out
137. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 710 nn.7 & 8 (2000).
138. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech). Unlike obscenity, indecency merits First Amendment
protection. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000).
139. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
140. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (alteration in original).
141. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971).
142. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387.
143. Id. at 386.
144. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
145. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citation
omitted).
146. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
147. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734 (2000).
148. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
149. See Lovell, 303 U.S. at 449.
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by activists constituted "historic weapons in the defense of liberty."'" In
Schneider v. New Jersey,'5' the Court affirmed that while the intended
recipient had a right to refuse the offered literature, the person offering
the literature had a constitutional right to tender it.'52 The Court rejected
the argument people had a right to be let alone on a public street based
on the rationale that the person seeking to communicate an idea could
just go elsewhere.' 3
In the abortion context, the last clear chance to persuade a pregnant
mother not to have a planned abortion is on the sidewalk leading to the
doors of the abortion clinic. So why did the Court in Hill go against its
own First Amendment values and principles, and ban an entire category
of free speech, namely the peaceful and respectful handing out of litera-
ture and conversational speech within eight feet of another person on a
public sidewalk without the prior consent of the intended recipient? Is it
a question of the content of the message? Has the Court created an ex-
ception to the communication of a moral message about a moral choice?
X. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE LET ALONE?
To understand the answers to these questions, it is necessary to ap-
preciate the judicial reasoning that led to the elevation of privacy to con-
stitutional status in Griswold v. Connecticut." In the private sanctity of
the bedroom, people found it repulsive that the government could police
the use of the birth control pill.' It was the decade of the 1960s-the
height of the sexual revolution-when, unlike any prior time in Ameri-
can history, the birth control pill invited sexual promiscuity without the
responsibility of parenthood.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Griswold, elevated sex-
ual privacy between married heterosexual couples to constitutional
status, without anchoring privacy to any one particular enumerated con-
stitutional right.'56 He cited academic literature' 7 and case law... to sup-
150. Id. at452.
151. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
152. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162.
153. See id. at 163.
154. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
155. It is now known that the birth control pill causes chemically induced abortions. See
RANDY ALCORN, DOES THE BIRTH CONTROL PILL CAUSE ABORTIONS? 13 (5th ed. 2000), at
http://www.epm.org/bcp.html.
156. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
157. E.g., William M. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962
Sup. CT. REV. 212 (1963) (discussing the meaning and scope of the right to privacy); Erwin N.
Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 216 (1960) (arguing that the "right to be let
alone," while not explicitly stated in the Constitution, is the underlying theme of the Bill of Rights).
158. E.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (the Constitution applies to
invasions of the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
656 (1961) (the Fourth Amendment creates a right to privacy that is of equal importance as
compared with all other basic rights in a free society).
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port his theory that privacy was a constitutional right.'59 To get around the
lack of specific text to anchor the constitutional right of privacy, he used
the word picture of a "penumbra""' to stretch the scope of the Constitu-
tion to include on its fringe the right to privacy: "specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance."16'
In developing his position, Justice Douglas referred to NAACP v.
Alabama.2 as authority for the idea that freedom of association was a
constitutional right contained within the First Amendment, even if the
text did not make this right apparent. ' He stated, "the First Amendment
has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intru-
sion.""' It is worth noting that Justice Douglas limited the right to pri-
vacy under the First Amendment to protection from the government and
not from the private individual."' Justice Douglas made this perfectly
clear in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,"' by explaining that his dissent in
Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia"7 arose out
of his opposition to government-sponsored radio programs."' The sig-
nificance of this was not lost on Justice Scalia in his Hill dissent when he
emphasized that the "right to be let alone," assuming it existed, was
159. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
160. The definition of "penumbra" includes: "a shadow cast (as in an eclipse) where the light is
partially but not wholly cut off by the intervening body" and "a surrounding or adjoining region in
which something exists in a lesser degree." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY
1673 (1986). Critics of this new constitutional right of privacy, upon which was founded the
constitutional right to an abortion, claimed it was created "out of nothing." Justices White and
Rehnquist, dissenting in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 785 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
might well have viewed the Justice Douglas' "Penumbra" as the "Twilight Zone:"
There is a fifth dimension beyond that which is known to man. It is a dimension as vast
as space and as timeless as infinity. It is the middle ground between light and shadow,
between science and superstition, and it lies between the pit of man's fears, and the
summit of his knowledge. This is the dimension of imagination. It is an area which we
call... THE TWILIGHT ZONE.
Rod Serling, http://www.scifi.comtwizone/twilite2.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2001).
161. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
162. 357 U.S. 449 (1964).
163. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
164. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (emphasis added).
165. See id. at 485.
166. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
167. 343 U.S. 451,467-69 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
168. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 517. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Pollak, defined "liberty," within
the purview of the Fifth Amendment, to include the right of "privacy," a right he thought was
infringed because a member of a "captive audience" was forced to listen to a government-sponsored
radio program. See Pollak, 343 U.S. at 467-69 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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"conferred, as against the government":" "it is the right of the speaker in
the public forum to be free from government interference."'7
Justice Douglas concluded that penumbras surrounding the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments impliedly created constitu-
tionally guaranteed zones of privacy as against the government.'7 ' In his
earlier dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Douglas sought to graft the right
to privacy onto the branch of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment,'" but
did not pursue that idea in Griswold.'73
Earlier cases involving "privacy and repose" lent legitimacy to the
recognition of a constitutional right to privacy. '74 However, the cases
cited by Justice Douglas all dealt with protecting the individual's right to
be let alone from the government, the solitary exception being Breard v.
City of Alexandria."' In Breard, the Court approved the municipal gov-
ernment's regulation of commercial speech at private residences.'7" Not
one of the cases cited by Justice Douglas in Griswold stood for the
proposition that, as between citizens in the public forum, there existed a
right to be let alone. The constitutional elevation of the right to be let
alone must, therefore, be restricted solely to freedom from government
and arguably also to freedom from commercial peddlers calling at one's
private residence.
The concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg agreed that marital pri-
vacy concerning the use of contraceptives was beyond the reach of gov-
ernment. 7 He rested his argument primarily upon the Ninth Amendment:
"In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the view
that the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth [a]nd Fourteenth Amendments
from infringement by the Federal Government or the States is not re-
stricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments."'7 8
Again, the right to be let alone applied against the government. Con-
cluding "the right of privacy is a fundamental personal right,"''7 9 Justice
169. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 751 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
170. Hill, 530 U.S. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
171. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
172. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 515-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
173. Justice Harlan's concurrence set forth the view that Connecticut's law violated the
"ordered liberty" guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan,
J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Justice White also would
have relied on the Fourteenth Amendment. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
174. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
175. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
176. See Breard, 341 U.S. at 644-45.
177. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
178. Id. at493.
179. Id. at 494.
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Goldberg cited with approval this passage from Justice Brandeis' dissent
in Olmstead v. United States'8°:
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth A]mendments is
much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recog-
nized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of
his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and sat-
isfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. 8'
None of the Justices in the Griswold majority appeared to contem-
plate a constitutional right to be let alone from fellow citizens in the
public forum. Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented in
Griswold.'82 They argued that no constitutional right to privacy existed
and that the use of the word "privacy" had the potential to both expand
and dilute constitutional freedoms:
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though
there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any
law ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" of individu-
als. But there is not. There are, of course, guarantees in certain spe-
cific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect
privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain activities.
Such, for example, is the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against "un-
reasonable searches and seizures." But I think it belittles that
Amendment to talk about it as though it protects nothing but "pri-
vacy." To treat it that way is to give it a niggardly interpretation, not
the kind of liberal reading I think any Bill of Rights provision should
be given. The average man would very likely not have his feelings
soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by hav-
ing it seized privately and by stealth. He simply wants his property
left alone. And a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated,
annoyed and injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a police-
man as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office or home.
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of
a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible
and more or less restricted in meaning. This fact is well illustrated by the
use of the term "right of privacy" as a comprehensive substitute for the
Fourth Amendment's guarantee against "unreasonable searches and sei-
180. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
181. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
182. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
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zures." "Privacy" is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can
easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also, on the other hand,
easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many things other
than searches and seizures. I have expressed the view many times that
First Amendment freedoms, for example, have suffered from a failure of
the courts to stick to the simple language of the First Amendment in con-
struing it, instead of invoking multitudes of words substituted for those
the Framers used.'85
In a footnote, Justice Black observed the Court had no jurisdiction
to elevate the right of privacy to constitutional status:
Observing that "the right of privacy .. presses for recognition here,"
today this Court, which I did not understand to have power to sit as a
court of common law, now appears to be exalting a phrase which
Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort relief, to the
level of a constitutional rule which prevents state legislatures from
passing any law deemed by this Court to interfere with "privacy.
' '
14
Justice Black warned of the potential adverse consequences of
shifting power to the judiciary implicit in the elevation of the right to be
let alone to constitutional status:
I repeat so as not to be misunderstood that this Court does have
power, which it should exercise, to hold laws unconstitutional where
they are forbidden by the Federal Constitution. My point is that there
is no provision of the Constitution which either expressly or im-
pliedly vests power in this Court to sit as a supervisory agency over
acts of duly constituted legislative bodies and set aside their laws be-
cause of the Court's belief that the legislative policies adopted are un-
reasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational. The adoption of
such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws uncon-
stitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great uncon-
stitutional shift of power to the courts which I believe and am con-
strained to say will be bad for the courts and worse for the country.
Subjecting federal and state laws to such an unrestrained and unre-
strainable judicial control as to the wisdom of legislative enactments
would, I fear, jeopardize the separation of governmental powers that
the Framers set up and at the same time threaten to take away much
of the power of States to govern themselves which the Constitution
plainly intended them to have.'85
Substantive due process loomed once again on the horizon, and Jus-
tice Black pleaded in vain with his colleagues on the Court to let the
183. Id. at 508-09 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphases added).
184. Id. at 510 n.1 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting majority opinion, id. at
485). See generally David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual History of
Tort Law, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (1991) (discussing the origin and evolution of the right to
privacy).
185. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 520-21 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
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Lochner doctrine' 6 sleep forever in peace. 7 The Court's own subjective
viewpoint and personal predilections concerning personal rights affecting
privacy were "no less dangerous" than earlier reasoning by the Lochner
Court about economic theories.'
Eisenstadt v. Baird"9 represented a turning point in the evolution of
the constitutional right to personal privacy. Justice Brennan constitution-
alized individual autonomy pertaining to reproductive freedom when he
extended the constitutional elevation of marital privacy in Griswold to
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried sexual partners in Eisen-
stadt.9 ° He wrote, "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.".'9' The significance of this pas-
sage is that it extended privacy from its confines of the marital bedroom
to fundamental, decisional, personal reproductive autonomy outside the
vows of marriage and the privacy of one's own home.' 2
Justice Brennan rested his opinion on previous opinions of the Court
establishing the fundamental principle that the government may not in-
trude into an individual's privacy except in very limited circumstances. '
186 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
187. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522-23 (Black, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
189. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
190. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54,
191. Id. at 453.
192. See Nan Hunter et al., Contemporary Challenges to Privacy Rights, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 195, 212 (1999).
193. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54. Brennan likely found the following excerpts from the
referenced previous opinions to be the most helpful:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the fight to receive information
and ideas.. . . This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social
worth, is fundamental to our free society. . . . [I]n the privacy of a person's own home--
that right takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
privacy ...
V ..Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (Marshall, J.) (citations omitted).
"There are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct
biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers
of a minority--even those who have been guilty of what the majority define as crimes."
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, farreaching [sic] and devastating
effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the
dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom
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As in Griswold, the majority did not attempt to establish a right to be let
alone from fellow citizens in the public forum.
Griswold inevitably linked the constitutional right to bear or beget
children to the constitutional decision of whether or not to terminate the
life of one's own unborn child through abortion.'' This set the stage for
Roe v. Wade,'95 which followed a year later.
Writing for the majority in Roe, Justice Blackmun concluded, "the
right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but ... this right
is not unqualified and must be considered against important state inter-
ests in regulation."'" The Court candidly acknowledged, "[t]he Constitu-
tion does not explicitly mention any right of privacy."'97 Citing a line of
authority to justify creating a constitutional right of privacy from the
government,'98 the Roe Court included Katz v. United States,'99 which
explicitly rejected a general constitutional right to be let alone from other
people:
The petitioner had phrased those questions as follows:
Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area
so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening record-
ing device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation of the
right to privacy of the user of the booth.
Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is
necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place
the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily
the law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He
is forever deprived of a basic liberty.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (Douglas, J.).
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his
own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government, especially of any
free government existing under a written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of
that will. But it is equally true that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty
may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. An
American citizen, arriving at an American port on a vessel in which, during the voyage,
there had been cases of yellow fever or Asiatic cholera, although apparently free from
disease himself, may yet, in some circumstances, be held in quarantine against his will on
board of such vessel or in a quarantine station, until it be ascertained by inspection,
conducted with due diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the
community at large has disappeared.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (Harlan, J.).
194. See Hunter, supra note 192 at 212-14.
195. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
196. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
197. Id. at 152.
198. Id.
199. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally protected
area." Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a
general constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion,
but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with pri-
vacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal pri-
vacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection
of a person's general right to privacy--his right to be let alone by
other people--is, like the protection of his property and of his very
life, left largely to the law of the individual States."
Similarly, the First Amendment cannot be translated into a general
constitutional right to be let alone from the free speech of other people.
Constitutionally protected areas, like bubble zones, have no place in
protecting individual privacy from governmental intrusions, as their
function has nothing to do with preventing the intrusion of the govern-
ment but with silencing the free speech rights of other people. Just as
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"'" so must the First
Amendment protect people who exercise freedom of speech, and not the
place (whether bubble zone or not) where that speech is tendered.
Justice Blackmun felt that the "concept of personal liberty and re-
strictions upon state action" in the Fourteenth Amendment served as the
constitutional home of a pregnant mother's right to decide "whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy."' The right to be let alone from gov-
ernment had now been reconstituted as a "new form of privacy" termed
"liberty of choice.""°
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist concluded there existed a limited right
of privacy to be free from government intrusion, that Roe marked a re-
turn to substantive due process and a revival of Lochner, and that no con-
stitutional right to personal privacy existed in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment:
If the Court means by the term "privacy" no more than that the claim
of a person to be free from unwanted state regulation of consensual
transactions may be a form of "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is no doubt that similar claims have been upheld in
our earlier decisions on the basis of that liberty....
While the Court's opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Lochner v. New York, the result it reaches is more closely
attuned to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that case. As
in Lochner and similar cases applying substantive due process standards
to economic and social welfare legislation, the adoption of the compel-
200. Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-51 (emphases added) (footnotes omitted).
201. Id.at 351.
202. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
203. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1395-96.
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ling state interest standard will inevitably require this Court to examine
the legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of these policies in the
very process of deciding whether a particular state interest put forward
may or may not be "compelling." The decision here to break pregnancy
into three distinct terms and to outline the permissible restrictions the
State may impose in each one, for example, partakes more of judicial
legislation than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters of
the Fourteenth Amendment. To reach its result, the Court necessarily has
had to find within the Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a right that
was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment.'
In Doe v. Bolton,'° the companion case to Roe, Justice White also
strongly opposed the newly minted constitutional right to an abortion,
finding "nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support
the Court's judgment.' 2 Prominent scholars, including John Hart Ely,
soon chastised the Court for its decision in Roe."5'
Freedom of choice to terminate a pregnancy soon became en-
trenched in American feminist culture as intrinsic to a woman's individ-
ual dignity and personal autonomy." The Supreme Court struck down
various legislative attempts by different states to confine, restrict, or cre-
ate an informed choice.' The law endowed a woman with the choice of
abortion on demand, and the government had no power to influence that
choice by raising "moral and spiritual questions."2'
Chief Justice Burger, who had earlier concurred in Roe and Doe,
expressed in Thornburgh his sense of betrayal and astonishment in ad-
204. Roe, 410 U.S. at 172-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
205. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
206. Doe, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-28 (Yale University
Press, Ltd. 1975) (questioning the Roe Court's justification for imposing its own model statute
regulating abortion); John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 947-49 (1973) (concluding Roe is "bad constitutional law" because it is not connected to
"any value the Constitution marks as special"); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 311 (1973)
(concluding the Roe Court exceeded its legitimate authority by going beyond the bounds of
"conventional morality").
208. See, e.g., the web site for the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League at
http://www.naral.orgLabout/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2001) ("a right to privacy includes
having access to safe and legal abortion, effective contraceptive options, and quality reproductive
health care").
209. "The States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life, to
intimidate women into continuing pregnancies." Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 443-44 (1983) (arguing that State statutes cannot go beyond permissible limits to ensure
informed consent because the information works not to inform the patient but to persuade her to
forego the procedure).
210. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 771-72.
2001]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
mitting the concerns predicted by the dissenters in Roe and Doe had been
right all along:
Yet today the Court astonishingly goes so far as to say that the State
may not even require that a woman contemplating an abortion be
provided with accurate medical information concerning the risks in-
herent in the medical procedure which she is about to undergo and the
availability of state-funded alternatives if she elects not to run those
risks. Can anyone doubt that the State could impose a similar re-
quirement with respect to other medical procedures? Can anyone
doubt that doctors routinely give similar information concerning risks
in countless procedures having far less impact on life and health, both
physical and emotional than an abortion, and risk a malpractice law-
suit if they fail to do so?
Yet the Court concludes that the State cannot impose this simple in-
formation-dispensing requirement in the abortion context where the
decision is fraught with serious physical, psychological, and moral
concerns of the highest order. Can it possibly be that the Court is
saying that the Constitution forbids the communication of such criti-
cal information to a woman? We have apparently already passed the
point at which abortion is available merely on demand. If the statute
at issue here is to be invalidated, the "demand" will not even have to
be the result of an informed choice.2
Into this legislative void identified by Chief Justice Burger stepped
Christian activists who assumed the role of sidewalk counselors,2 2 free of
any tie to government authority. "The constitutional right to an abortion"
was, after all, "a right against the state, not private individuals..2.. Many
people had assumed that private influence to provide educational infor-
mational and alternative choices to abortion that might dissuade a woman
from choosing an abortion would not violate any constitutional right to
an abortion.2 " Activists did not confine this activism to sidewalk coun-
seling, but often accompanied it with blockades of clinic entrances and
large-scale demonstrations. 5 Courts issued injunctions to quell the anti-
abortion protests, 26 and state ordinances followed.22 The creation of bub-
211. Id. at 783-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
212. See generally J.C. Wilkie, A Protective Ring or Violence? at
http://www.priestsforlife.org/articles/protectivering.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2001) (explaining the
role of sidewalk counselors who provide a "protective ring" outside abortion clinics to prevent
violence and to witness to women before and after the abortion).
213. See James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of Judicial
Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 471, 502 (1996).
214. "'Sidewalk counseling' consists of efforts 'to educate, counsel, persuade, or inform
passersby about abortion and abortion alternatives by means of verbal or written speech, including
conversation and/or display of signs and/or distribution of literature."' Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 708 (2000) (quoting petitioner's appeal brief).
215. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 758-59 (1994); Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1997).
216. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757; Schenck, 519 U.S. at 366.
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ble zones provided a zone of privacy for those unwilling to hear the anti-
abortion message.28 Violent acts ensued.29
Does the government have the legal right to prevent private indi-
viduals, like sidewalk counselors, from talking women out of exercising
their constitutional right to an abortion, by exercising their constitutional
right to free speech? In the court battles that resulted, judges had the op-
portunity to insert their viewpoints into the abortion controversy.22
XI. ASSESSING THE DAMAGE TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Now that Hill has settled the lawfulness of the bubble zone, the
sidewalk counselor has the burden to identify and retreat from the un-
willing listener. Practically, this task is impossible and puts an end not
only to a class of free speech, sidewalk counseling, but also to the sub-
stance of that speech. Of greater significance has been the damage done
to the First Amendment. The casualty list begins with Madsen, continues
with Schenck, and concludes for now with Hill.
In Madsen, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of
an injunction and its establishment of a thirty-six-foot bubble zone on a
public street outside of an abortion clinic in Melbourne, Florida.2' In
doing so, the Court prohibited numerous individuals, united by their op-
position to abortion, and who had broken no law, from exercising their
constitutional rights of assembly, free speech, and association within the
judicially created bubble zone.2 The evidence did not include a hint of
violence, and visitors freely entered and exited the abortion clinic. 223 The
Court relaxed the strict scrutiny standard established by precedent, which
courts had to apply whenever they imposed a content-based or view-
point-based limitation on First Amendment rights in a public forum.224
Instead, the Court created for the law of the sacred cow, the new right of
abortion, a lesser standard, which falls between strict scrutiny and inter-
mediate scrutiny.2' This new "intermediate-intermediate" scrutiny test is
as follows: "Whereas intermediate scrutiny requires that the restriction
be 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,' the new
standard requires that the restriction 'burden no more speech than neces-
sary to serve a significant government interest.'
22 6
217. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 707 (upholding a Colorado statute banning sidewalk counseling
within an eight-foot bubble zone with respect to an unwilling listener).
218. See Weinstein, supra note 213, at 472.
219. See, e.g., A Brief History of Anti-Abortion Violence Patterns,
at http://www.feministcampus.org/sam3-historysub.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2001).
220. See Weinstein, supra note 213, at 506.
221. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757-58.
222. See id. at 785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See id. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 790-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 791 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion, id. at 765).
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The second attack on the First Amendment was the nature of the
injunction itself. By definition, the injunction constituted a prior restraint
of free speech, and as such, presented the "greatest threat '227 to First
Amendment values. To allow the injunction to continue directly con-
flicted with a long history of striking down speech-restricting
injunctions.. that had, by their nature, a heavy presumption against con-
stitutional validity. 9 The majority's reliance on NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.3° and Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess
Anne,23' was misplaced and contradictory. The court did not achieve
pin-pointed, narrowly couched tailoring to meet government interests.
The bubble zone constituted a blanket ban on an entire species of free
speech - the normal conversation.
By giving its imprimatur to the bubble zone, the Supreme Court
legitimized viewpoint discrimination against anti-abortionists exercising
their free speech rights, signaling its implied approval of future laws to
silence pro-life speech. This discrimination served another purpose, as it
also defended the Court's illegitimate creation of a constitutional right to
an abortion by silencing its critics. Like a loaded gun,' the injunction
became an available weapon to be used as a prior restraint against pro-
life speech before an activist ever uttered a word.
In Schenck, the Supreme Court upheld as constitutionally valid a
fixed, fifteen-foot bubble zone, established by judicial injunction, against
anti-abortion demonstrators in Rochester and Buffalo, New York.- The
injunction's original terms permitted the presence of two sidewalk coun-
selors inside the zone, provided their conduct conformed to the terms of
a cease and desist order.236
The cease and desist provision forced sidewalk counselors located
inside the buffer zones to retreat fifteen feet from the person being coun-
seled once the person indicated a desire not to be counseled. 7 This
227. Id. at 797 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1957); Org. for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964); Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976); Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43,
44 (1977); Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980); CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510
U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994).
229. See Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419.
230. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
231. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
232. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 798 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. See, e.g., Carroll, 393 U.S. at 183-84 ("An order issued in the area of First Amendment
rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective
permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the order.")
234. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
235. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357,361,364, 380 (1997).
236. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 381 n.l 1.
237. See id. at 369-70.
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clause facilitated a recipient's escape from hearing any moral message."
It was triggered just by saying "no" to the communication offered by the
counselor, or "don't talk to me," before the counselor initiated any con-
versation. 9 The constitutionality of the cease and desist clause was ap-
pealed and held by the Court to be a proper restriction of the appellant's
First Amendment rights.2'
Unlike the facts in Madsen, which emphasized the need of abortion
clinic patients for peace and quiet conducive to rest and repose,' the
facts in Schenck did not turn on noise but on a history of "peaceful con-
versations ... devolv[ing] into aggressive and sometimes violent con-
duct." 2 In these circumstances, the Court decided, "a record of abusive
conduct makes a prohibition on classic speech in limited parts of a public
sidewalk permissible." 4'
Chief Justice Rehnquist considered and rejected a "right" to be let
alone in the public forum:
Petitioners also contend that the "cease and desist" provision which
limits the exception for sidewalk counselors in connection with the
fixed buffer zone is contrary to the First Amendment. We doubt that
the District Court's reason for including that provision--"to protect the
right of the people approaching and entering the facilities to be left
alone"--accurately reflects our First Amendment jurisprudence in this
area. Madsen sustained an injunction designed to secure physical ac-
cess to the clinic, but not on the basis of any generalized right "to be
left alone" on a public street or sidewalk.2
In dissent, Justice Scalia deplored the Court's unwillingness to
strike down the fixed bubble zone since the court created the zone based
on the invalid theory of a "right to be let alone" in the public forum and
not on the right of unobstructed access to the abortion clinic.:
Justice Scalia was appalled at the gratuitous language chosen by the
majority to accommodate free speech rights, when the Court could have
adopted a more assertive protective stance to enhance free speech
rights. 2' He was further alarmed by the Court's unprecedented expansion
of jurisdiction and power on its own motion to protect the public
interest.247 This move, feared Justice Scalia, intruded the function of the
238. See id.
239. See id. at 369.
240. See id. at 384-85.
241. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994).
242. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 383 (emphases added).
245. Id. at 387-88 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246. See id. at 390-91 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. Specifically, Scalia stated:
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executive branch of government, thereby upsetting the constitutional
balance of powers.24 8
Also disturbing was the Court's departure from settled practice in
the way in which the Court approached its review of lower court injunc-
tions. Instead of validating the Schenck injunction on the basis of the
facts actually found by the District Court, the Supreme Court reviewed
the injunction based on of what the court below "might have" found."9
These aberrations from established general legal doctrines amounted
to more evidence that the law of the sacred cow was making a "destruc-
tive inroad upon First Amendment law."25
Left undecided in Schenck was "whether the governmental interests
involved would ever justify some sort of zone of separation between
individuals entering the clinics and protesters, measured by the distance
between the two."2 ' The affirmative answer to this question came in
Hill.
252
In 1993, the Colorado state legislature enacted a law making it ille-
gal to "'knowingly approach' within eight feet of another person, without
that person's consent, 'for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to,
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling
The Court proceeds from there to make a much more significant point: An injunction on
speech may be upheld even if not justified on the basis of the interests asserted by the
plaintiff, as long as it serves "public safety." "[I]n assessing a First Amendment
challenge, a court ... inquires into the governmental interests that are protected by the
injunction, which may include an interest in public safety and order.... Here, the District
Court cited public safety as one of the interests justifying the injunction. ... [T]he fact
that 'threat to public safety' is not listed anywhere in respondents' complaint as a claim
does not preclude a court from relying on the significant governmental interest in public
safety in assessing petitioners' First Amendment argument."
This is a wonderful expansion of judicial power. Rather than courts' being limited to
according relief justified by the complaints brought before them, the Court today
announces that a complaint gives them, in addition, ancillary power to decree what may
be necessary to protect--not the plaintiff, but the public interest! Every private suit makes
the district judge a sort of one-man Committee of Public Safety. There is no precedent for
this novel and dangerous proposition.
Id. at 392-93 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).
248. See id. at 393-94 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. Scalia expressed disagreement with the majority's departure from established practice:
We are not in the business (or never used to be) of making up conclusions that the trial
court could permissibly have reached on questions involving assessments of fact,
credibility, and future conduct--and then affirming on the basis of those posited
conclusions, whether the trial court in fact arrived at them or not. That is so even in
ordinary cases, but it is doubly true when we review a trial court's order imposing a prior
restraint upon speech.
Id. at 389 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alterations in original) (footnote
omitted).
250. Id. at 394 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. Id. at 377.
252. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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with such other person."' 3 This law had the effect of banning sidewalk
counseling on public sidewalks within 100 feet of abortion clinic en-
trances.25 The state's declared purpose in creating this law was to enable
women to have unimpeded access to abortion clinics." s In Hill, oppo-
nents unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of this eight-foot
bubble zone. 6
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the First
Amendment rights of the speaker were subordinate to the privacy rights
of the unwilling listener. 7 This was so even though, unlike in Schenck,
the sidewalk counselors acted politely and respectfully. " It made no dif-
ference that speech occurred in a public forum. 9 This result was un-
precedented and contrary to the Court's First Amendment teachings.
Despite all this, the Court's decision was predictable due to the necessity
to distort the law to shield the law of the sacred cow - abortion. The de-
cision constituted a simian response of: "[h]ear no evil, see no evil, speak
no evil."26'
To save the Colorado law, the Court elevated a common law right of
privacy to a constitutional "interest" that outweighed, on the scales of
justice, the preferred constitutional right of free speech."' The Court
ruled in a bold and unabashed manner that revived old case law sup-
pressing the free speech rights of trade unionists.263 In championing the
253. Hill, 530 U.S. at 707 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999)).
254. See id. at 708-09.
255. See id at 708 n. I (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (1999)).
256. See id. at 707, 712, 735.
257. See id. at 718 (quoting Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736
(1970)).
258. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 710.
259. Seeid. at 718.
260. See id. at 741-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. You can order your own monkey trio in the now famous poses at
http://www.mentomerc.com/mentomerc/hear.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001)
or http://www.amerasiaimports.com/26k-29k/29586-30130.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001).
262. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 718.
263. See id. at 717 (quoting Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 204 (1921)). Not referred to in Hill was another passage from American Steel Foundries that
the court could have used to justify its categorization of sidewalk counselors located inside the
bubble zone as "missionaries":
Each case must turn on its own circumstances. It is a case for the flexible remedial power
of a court of equity which may try one mode of restraint, and if it fails or proves to be too
drastic, may change it. We think that the strikers and their sympathizers engaged in the
economic struggle should be limited to one representative for each point of ingress and
egress in the plant or place of business and that all others be enjoined from congregating
or loitering at the plant or in the neighboring streets by which access is had to the plant,
that such representatives should have the right of observation, communication and
persuasion but with special admonition that their communication, arguments and appeals
shall not be abusive, libelous or threatening, and that they shall not approach individuals
together but singly, and shall not in their single efforts at communication or persuasion,
obstruct an unwilling listener by importunate following or dogging his steps. This is not
laid down as a rigid rule, but only as one which should apply to this case under the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence and which may be varied in other cases. It
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right of the unwilling recipient to be let alone, the Court offered no guid-
ance on how a sidewalk counselor, intending to exercise his or her free
speech rights,.could possibly know in advance of tendering a communi-
cation, whether the intended recipient was willing or unwilling to hear a
moral message about abortion. A wrong guess would result in a violation
of the criminal law.2M
Justice Scalia did not disappoint in delivering a scathing analysis of
the damage caused by Hill to the First Amendment.265 If the subject mat-
ter were not abortion, Justice Scalia predicted the Court would have in-
stantly found Colorado's law to be content-based2" and viewpoint dis-
criminatory.267 Justice Scalia viewed the abandonment of the strict scru-
tiny standard as a contrived fabrication intended to permit the survival of
the bubble zone under the less onerous standard for content-neutral
speech regulations.'
The Court's characterization of the law as one that regulated places,
not speech, 9 was just as convincing to Justice Scalia, as the Emperor
was to the child who could not be fooled in Hans Christian Andersen's
children's fable, The Emperor's New Clothes.27° To Justice Scalia, the
becomes a question for the judgment of the chancellor who has heard the witnesses,
familiarized himself with the locus in quo and observed the tendencies to disturbance and
conflict. The purpose should be to prevent the inevitable intimidation of the presence of
groups of pickets, but to allow missionaries.
Am. Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 206-07 (emphases added).
264. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3).
265. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 741-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scholarly articles published in
response to Hill have also been critical of its damage to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Martin H.
Belsky, Privacy: The Rehnquist Court's Unmentionable "Right," 36 TULSA L.J. 43, 47-48 (2000)
("privacy is not a fundamental right, and therefore there is no special need to protect access as part
of the right"); Brian W. Oberst, Casenote, Buffering Free Speech: An Examinatibn of the Impact of
Colorado's Buffer Zone Law on Protected Speech After Hill v. Colorado, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (2000), 24
HAMLINE L. REV. 89, 92 (2000) ("the Hill [sic] Court erroneously concluded that Subsection (3) was
a constitutional time, place, and manner restriction on protection [sic] speech"); Christy E. Wilhelm,
Notes, If You Can't Say Something Nice, Don't Say Anything at All: Hill v. Colorado and the
Antiabortion Protest Controversy, 23 CAMPBELL L. REV. 117, 141 (2000) ("one can only hope the
creation of this new 'right' [to be let alone] does not symbolize the end of a traditional freedom").
266. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. See id. at 748-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269. See id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 719).
270. The fable reads, in part:
Everyone said, loud enough for the others to hear: "Look at the Emperor's new clothes.
They're beautiful!"
"What a marvelous train!"
"And the colors! The colors of that beautiful fabric! I have never seen anything like it in
my life." They all tried to conceal their disappointment at not being able to see the
clothes, and since nobody was willing to admit his own stupidity and incompetence, they
all behaved as the two scoundrels had predicted.
A child, however, who had no important job and could only see things as his eyes showed
them to him, went up to the carriage.
"The Emperor is naked," he said. "Fool!" his father reprimanded, running after him.
"Don't talk nonsense!" He grabbed his child and took him away. But the boy's remark,
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naked truth was that "if protecting people from unwelcome communica-
tions (the governmental interest the Court posits) is a compelling state
interest, the First Amendment is a dead letter.
'27'
The ultimate irony was that in Hill, the State repudiated any interest
in protecting its citizens' rights to be let alone from unwanted speech,
and yet the Court fictitiously attributed this purpose to the impugned
legislation.2 72 The Court flip-flopped from its holding in Schenck, where it
had disavowed the right to be let alone.273 Instead, in Hill, the Court "re-
package[d] ... the 'right'[to be let alone] as an 'interest"' deserving of
protection," and created a new right to be let alone, not from the gov-
ernment, where such a principle existed, 75 but from a private individual
in the public forum, where no such principle existed.7
The opinion elevated the abortion clinic, a commercial business, to
the constitutional status of a private residence.7 No longer did the recipi-
ent of an unwanted message have the burden to avert one's eyes or toler-
ate unwelcome speech.275 The burden had shifted to the speaker.279
In upholding Colorado's bubble zone, the Court approved the ap-
proach of prophylaxis, "the antithesis of narrow tailoring.' '  Speech op-
posing abortion was unwelcome. The list of wounds to the First Amend-
ment grew: "So one can add to the casualties of our whatever-it-takes
pro-abortion jurisprudence the First Amendment doctrine of narrow tai-
loring and over-breadth. R.I.P.,"
2 '
XII. CONCLUSION
A new era has begun. A corresponding right to be free from speech
now matches speech rights. Every individual, in the public forum, now
which had been heard by the bystanders, was repeated over and over again until everyone
cried:
"The boy is right! The Emperor is naked! It's true!" The Emperor realized that the people
were right but could not admit to that. He thought it better to continue the procession
under the illusion that anyone who couldn't see his clothes was either stupid or
incompetent.
The entire fable may be read at http://www.geocities.com/Athens/2424/clothes.html (last visited
Sept. 8, 2001).
271. Hill, 530 U.S. at 748-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. See id. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273. See id. at 750-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.
N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997).
274. Id. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 717 n.24).
275. See id. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210
(1975).
276. See id. at 752 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 716).
277. See id. at 753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. See id. at 752-53 (Scalia. J., dissenting) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 948 (2d ed. 1988).
279. See id. at 752 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 762 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 729).
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has a right to veto another individual's First Amendment rights.2 ' The
inevitable result, silence, will replace the cacophony of a free society
engaged in robust debate. The government is our "Father Knows Best," 3
deciding not just what can be said, but where, when, and in what manner.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has enacted legislation imitating
Colorado's buffer zone law and has relied on Hill to justify its restric-
tions against free speech.2" Once upon a time, Justice Stevens wrote,
"The First Amendment mandates that we presume that speakers, not the




Speech opposing abortion has lost its First Amendment status.
2 6
Only time will reveal whether the damage caused by the Court to its First
Amendment jurisprudence will remain confined to the abortion context
or spread like an out-of-control virus throughout the entire body of First
Amendment law. The implications for environmentalists, trade unionists,
evangelists, politicians, and others are enormous and serious. The Court
has opened a Pandora's box87 that it can only close by killing the sacred
cow of abortion.
The root cause of the distortion to First Amendment jurisprudence is
the line of reasoning that began in Griswold and flowered in Roe. The
true nature of the beast was revealed in Thornburgh and manifested in
Stenberg. At a minimum, the Court must reverse Roe to stem the bleed-
ing of the First Amendment before it becomes fatal. How the Court will
eventually handle the free speech issues in the Nuremberg Files case"
will serve as a predictor of the future of the First Amendment.
As long as the law of the sacred cow of abortion exists, courts will
suspend general First Amendment principles and values when it comes to
the First Amendment rights of those who oppose abortion and wish to
persuade others that a moral choice deserves consideration. The right or
interest to be let alone in the public forum from moral or other messages
is an invention created specifically for the law of the sacred cow. It has
no basis in history or precedent, and is an embarrassment to the intellect
of those who sit on the Supreme Court. The Court's "imposition of its
282. See Flynn, supra note 59, at 648.
283. See Tim's TV Showcase, Father Knows Best, at http://www.timvp.com/father.html (last
modified June 2001) (explaining that Father Knows Best was a situation comedy aired on television
from 1954 to 1962, where the father of the household dealt with the routine problems of his family).
284. See McGuire v. Reilly, 122 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D. Mass. 2000), rev'd, 260 F.3d 36 (1st
Cir. 2001); Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 430 Mass. 1205, 1211 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
285. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 790-791 (1988).
286. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 760.
287. See Olympus Productions,The Enduring Appeal of Myths,
at http://www.dcs.ed.ac.uk/home/me/pandora.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2001) (explaining the origin
of this myth).
288. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Williamette Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 244
F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001).
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own, extraconstitutional value preferences" " is obvious, and more than
that, is a classic illustration of prescribing what shall be orthodox in
matters of opinion.2' In defending the dubious right to an abortion, the
Court has perpetuated the law of the sacred cow.
The right to an abortion has become a cultural and religious symbol
to feminists and secular humanists who have figuratively wrapped
around this icon of personal autonomy the American flag. Those who
would have the temerity to attack this sacred right to an abortion by per-
suading others there is another choice have been vilified as traitors.
Consider the scorn heaped upon Gregory Lee Johnson, who was
convicted of desecrating an American flag in Dallas, Texas.29' The Su-
preme Court freed Johnson, holding, "If there is a bedrock principle un-
derlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself of-
fensive or disagreeable. 292 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan ex-
plicitly refused to create "the law of the American flag":
There is, moreover, no indication--either in the text of the Constitu-
tion or in our cases interpreting it--that a separate juridical category
exists for the American flag alone. Indeed, we would not be surprised
to learn that the persons who framed our Constitution and wrote the
Amendment that we now construe were not known for their reverence
for the Union Jack. The First Amendment does not guarantee that
other concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole--such as the
principle that discrimination on the basis of race is odious and de-
structive--will go unquestioned in the market-place of ideas. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio.... We decline, therefore, to create for the flag
an exception to the joust of principles protected by the First Amend-
ment.'9'
Just as the Court would have been gravely mistaken to create the
"law of the Stars and Stripes," it caused a serious and damaging error by
creating a separate juridical category for abortion, the law of the sacred
cow.
Opponents of abortion do not present a "clear and present danger""
to American society. Law must not be used as a means to criminalize the
conduct of sidewalk counselors who act on their moral imperative to
289. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 794 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
290. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in ... matters of opinion).
291. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
292. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
293. Id. at 417-18 (emphases added) (citation omitted).
294. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
2001]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
persuade others abortion is wrong. The better approach is to facilitate
opportunities for free and fearless reasoning in full discussions.9
"[F]ree speech is the rule, not the exception. ' It is unconstitutional
to suppress speech just because of "fear, . . . passionate opposition
against the speech, . . . [or] a revolted dislike for its contents."297 Would
immediate injury to society occur if speech by sidewalk counselors were
allowed within a bubble zone? The answer is an emphatic "no." Argua-
bly, society would benefit from less abortions, as the state has an interest
in the birth of new and potentially useful citizens.299 If so, the remedy is
"more speech, not enforced silence."2
Justice Jackson's words in Barnette ring true today, just as strongly
as when he penned these words for the ages:
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find them-
selves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard....
... [T]he First Amendment ... was designed to avoid these ends by
avoiding these beginnings .... Authority here is to be controlled by
public opinion, not public opinion by authority....
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its sub-
stance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the ex-
isting order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act there faith therein.3°°
Not since the issue of slavery tore apart this nation has an issue been
more divisive than abortion. Differing on the moral question of abortion
touches the heart of the nation. Close-mindedness, bubble zones, and
coerced silence in the public forum have no place in a democratic soci-
ety. "Without open minds there can be no open society. And if society be
not open the spirit of man is mutilated and becomes enslaved."3 ' No de-
bate can ever be won "by shutting one's ears or ... silencing
295. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
296. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 585.
297. Id.
298. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
299. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring), overruled in
part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
300. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (emphasis added).
301. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 556 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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opponents."' As long as there is personal freedom and the courage to
speak out, one thing is known for certain: the truth will go marching
on.
303
302. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 553 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Sir William Haley, What
Standards for Broadcasting?, MEASURE, Summer 1950, at 211-12).
303 See Julia Ward Howe, Battle Hymn of the Republic, at
www.ukans.edu/carfie/docs/texts/battle/htm (last visited December 3, 2001 ).
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